A Game Theoretic Perspective on the Current Voting Dilemma

I am here trying to expose the rational reasons of my choice. My decision is to invalidate my vote in the upcoming elections.
You have a rational player (lets call him S) who is now entrusted with setting a up game were different parties compete. S has a vested interest in the outcome of the game. S would have to be incredibly altruistic not to make the rules of the game favor the outcome he desires.

You have also have another player, (lets call him M) who has been getting small positive payoffs from S. M was foolish enough to think he could outmaneuver S at his own game. In fact, M was directly responsible for putting S in a position to put down the rules of the game and was immediately given small rewards, while another player (named R) objected strongly. 

In strategic interactions between S and R, S has shown himself to be completely non-altruistic and R suffered severe negative payoffs. In strategic interactions between M and R, M has shown himself to be also completely non-altruistic and R suffered negative payoffs, but not as severe as when it interacted with S. 

R is now asked to support either M or S in a game in which he was eliminated. The outcome of that game will determine who gets to interact strategically with R in the future. R’s support for either player is costly (i.e. it is an acknowledgment of the rules of  the game). R knows that S will not be fully eliminated under any outcome. R calculates that his expected payoff is unlikely to change under any outcome. R knows that although long ago his payoffs were strongly correlated with M, but that has ceased to be the case.
R decides not play this game.

From my point of view R would not be able to play unless M is the winner.
R his reaction dose not have any value as he is out of the play and probability of entering this game while two players exist equal to 0.
So we can devide the game into 2 games first between S and M then R will find his place in the next game with the winner and as we looking for R to win we need player from first game (the one with no power or less power) specially we will found a lot of org standing beside R if he aganist M which is not exist in case of R V.s S

  • @Abdoul-Rhaman Al-Shaar
    Your reasoning implies the existence of an implicit trust between R and M, or R and S that would make that cooperation (even in one stage of the game) possible.
    Since both M and S have shown that their payoffs are totally orthogonal to R, trust can never established.
    R will suffer more if cooperates with either parties. Both are very narrowly self interested players.
    In siding with either party against the other, R is will end up being used like a pawn in game where his payoffs are at best slightly negative.

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